Imran contests the decision of ECP to hold a jail contempt trial

Imran contests the decision of ECP to hold a jail contempt trial

Imran Khan, the prime minister and former chairman of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), contested the Election Commission of Pakistan’s (ECP) decision to hold his contempt trial at Adiala jail on Saturday.

The main focus of the contempt case is Imran’s alleged use of disparaging and disrespectful language against Sikander Sultan Raja, the Chief Election Commissioner, at news conferences and public events.

The former prime minister asked the court to overturn the contested ruling from the ECP dated November 30, 2023, which mandated that he be tried or have his proceedings held in Adiala jail due to unidentified security concerns.

Along with pleading with the court to declare closed trials in prison to be an outright violation of fundamental rights, the PTI head urged the appropriate authorities to hold his trial in a public, open courtroom, just like regular court sessions.

In addition, he requested that the Election Act 2017 be used to stop the Election Commission’s procedures and prevent the respondent CEC from putting him in jail, giving him orders, or using coercion against him.

Respondents included the superintendent district of Adiala jail, the secretary of the federal government’s Ministry of Law and Justice, the ECP through its CEC, secretary, director general (law), secretary of the Ministry of Interior, and the additional inspector general (AIG) of police (operations).

Barrister Sameer Khosa, who represented Imran in filing the suit, said that the impugned decision erroneously maintains that respondent CEC has the authority to order a trial that will take place in secret and in jail. He continued by saying that the CEC has been depending on the report provided by superintendent Adiala jail, which indicates that since contempt procedures are sui generis proceedings, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898’s requirements do not apply.

The respondent CEC has overlooked the fact that there is no inherent authority to conduct proceedings in this way unless it is specifically given permission by a statute to do so. Given that the report by the respondent, Superintendent Jail, states that the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not apply to the proceedings, there is no authorization in either the Elections Act 2017 or the Contempt of Court Ordinance 2003 to conduct proceedings in jail.”

“Thus, the impugned order, in purporting to exercise a power that ECP does not have, is patently without jurisdiction.” He argued that the CEC is an executive entity and not a court with the authority to exercise judicial functions.

“Neither is it a court for Article 204 of the Constitution, Article 175, or the High Court as mandated by Article 203 of the Constitution.”

He went on to say that even in the event that a statute gives a court authority, the CEC, which is not a court, cannot exercise that authority.

“The criticized order issued by CEC is based on the report submitted by Superintendent Jail, which claims that since the Election Act 2017 fails to identify the place of sitting or trial for contempt proceedings and because the federal government has already approved certain orders for trials to be held in jail, respondent CEC has the authority to order a trial in secret and in jail.”

The attorney went on to say that this is an instance of an executive or administrative agency taking on authority for itself that isn’t either stated in the Constitution or permitted by the enabling laws. Rather, the CEC has assumed that because superintendent Adiala jail says so, it has the authority to choose the trial’s venue.

It stated that silence could not be interpreted as giving respondent CEC and Superintendent Adiala jail the freedom to interpret the Election Act and the Constitution however they saw fit. There was a legal framework in the Constitution. The petition also stated, “It is not a blank slate on which respondent CEC and Superintendent Jail can write whatever they want to.”

“The constitution’s design has been carefully considered in order to guarantee that people’ fundamental rights are shielded from undue intervention. The mention of how past jail proceedings have been conducted does not vouch for the legitimacy or acceptability of jail trials. It demonstrates that Superintendent Adiala jail and respondent CEC have already made the decision to deny the petitioner his fundamental rights and are doing so under the guise of other processes.